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Introduction 
 
 
Faraway, So Close: Approaching the 
Endgame in the Cyprus Negotiations 
Ioannis N. Grigoriadis 
Substantial progress was achieved in the bicommunal negotiations that were ongoing 
for almost two years and led to the decision to continue the talks in Switzerland. The 
aim was to create conditions conducive to a final bargaining agreement between the 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and the three guarantor states of the Republic of 
Cyprus: Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Although recent talks in Switzerland 
failed to deliver a breakthrough, negotiations continue, and hope survives. With the 
exception of negotiations on security and guarantees – a chapter whose negotiation in-
evitably also involves Cyprus’ three guarantor states – convergence on negotiations in 
all other chapters, namely territory, property, governance and power sharing, as well as 
economic and EU matters, have resulted in agreement or have brought the positions of 
the parties within the radius of an agreement. 
 
On 11 January 2017 the Greek Cypriot and 
Turkish Cypriot leaders, Nicos Anastasiades 
and Mustafa Akıncı, exchanged maps in 
Geneva reflecting the territorial breakdown 
and adjustments between the two future 
constituent states of the Federal Republic 
of Cyprus. This was the first time in the his-
tory of Cyprus negotiations that this has 
happened. The maps differed by 1 percent 
only, but the difference was significant, as 
it involved the contested town of Morphou 
(Güzelyurt). Moreover, the parties were said 
to be close to agreeing on a presidency that 
would rotate between Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots. Regarding security and 
guarantees, the withdrawal of Turkish 
troops and the abolition of the guarantee 
system are key issues of Greek Cypriots and 
Greece. On the other hand, Turkish Cyp-
riots and Turkey insist on the permanent 
presence of Turkish troops and the con-
tinuation of the guarantee system after a 
solution is found. Attempts to bridge the 
gap and develop innovative security ar-
rangements that could address the funda-
mental security needs of both communities 
without undermining the sovereignty of 
the post-solution Republic of Cyprus are 
underway. There are reasons to believe that 
this process has stronger chances of success 
than the one in 2004, which ended in the 
rejection of the Annan Plan. 
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Two Moderate Leaders 
The main reason for the resilience of hope 
is the presence of two of the most moderate 
Cypriot political leaders at the helm of 
the negotiation process than at any time 
before. Although the coinciding tenures 
of two prior moderate leaders, Demetris 
Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, between 
2008 and 2010 failed to deliver results and 
ended in acrimony, things have gone better 
this time. The president of the Republic of 
Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, in his capacity 
as leader of the Greek Cypriot community, 
and the president of the unrecognized 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 
Mustafa Akıncı, in his capacity as leader 
of the Turkish Cypriot community, enjoy 
credentials of moderation that are hard to 
dispute. As the leader of the Democratic 
Rally party (DISY), Anastasiades was the 
only major political figure who endorsed 
the Annan Plan in 2004. In his long politi-
cal career as mayor of the Turkish Cypriot 
sector of Nicosia and political party leader, 
Akıncı has been one of the pioneers of bi-
communal dialogue and cooperation. Both 
leaders have rebuffed scathing criticism 
from their respective hardliners, proven 
their commitment to a compromise solu-
tion in Cyprus, and made unprecedented 
progress toward reaching it. Both defined 
the process as a “Cypriot-owned” one. In the 
Annan Plan negotiations, the UN Secretary-
General was allowed to act as arbitrator; 
as a result, the final version of the plan did 
not enjoy the full endorsement of the par-
ties, which allowed the then president of 
the Republic of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopou-
los, to call for its rejection. This time, there 
will not be a peace plan without the ex-
plicit endorsement of the leaders of both 
communities. If they reach an agreement, 
both would defend it in their respective 
communities and campaign for them be-
fore the respective referendums. 
An Unusual Alliance 
Another important reason for optimism 
is the common front that the two biggest 
political parties of the Republic of Cyprus – 
DISY and the Progressive Party of Working 
People (AKEL) – have established with 
respect to the peace process. The alliance 
of the two biggest parties is a necessary, 
albeit not sufficient, condition for a success-
ful outcome in a Cyprus referendum. AKEL’s 
decision to object to the Annan Plan in 
the 2004 referendum was one of the main 
reasons why the “no” vote reached 75.83 
percent, while Turkish Cypriots approved 
the plan with 64.91 percent. Given that any 
new agreement is expected to be brought to 
a new referendum, the strong collaboration 
of the two biggest Greek Cypriot political 
parties reinforces the ability of President 
Anastasiades to make compromises, and it 
substantially increases the chance of a posi-
tive result in the event of a referendum. 
The Guarantor States 
Nevertheless, the goodwill of the two Cyp-
riot leaders is a necessary, but not suffi-
cient, condition for the resolution of the 
Cyprus issue. This would not only entail the 
commitment of the three guarantor states – 
most importantly Turkey, which, ever since 
its 1974 invasion and occupation of the 
northern part of the island, has maintained 
critical influence over the self-proclaimed 
“Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” – 
but also Greece and the United Kingdom. 
Greece’s influence over the Republic of 
Cyprus may have waned since 1974, but it 
would be politically very difficult for any 
Greek Cypriot political leader to support a 
deal without the explicit and firm support 
of the Greek government. The United King-
dom, on its side, has maintained two sov-
ereign military bases on Cyprus, which are 
expected to provide crucial leverage in 
the event of a solution, as far as security 
arrangements are concerned. 
The Multiple Faces of the Greek 
Coalition Government 
In view of the above, how do Greece and 
Turkey – the two countries whose historic 
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rivalry has also been reflected on Cyprus – 
view the prospect of conflict resolution? 
In the case of Greece, although the govern-
ment has publicly endorsed the peace pro-
cess, some statements on the question of 
security and guarantees shed doubts about 
Greece’s willingness to accept a compro-
mise deal. To better understand the situa-
tion, one has to look into the background 
of the government coalition partners. Al-
though the political movements that the 
major government coalition partner – 
the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) – 
originated from have historically supported 
conflict resolution and reconciliation in 
Cyprus, today’s enlarged SYRIZA is a less 
homogeneous party. A sizeable part of 
its current rank and file have professed 
nationalist views on the Cyprus issue and 
objected to conflict resolution along the 
lines of a bizonal, bicommunal federation. 
The decision of Prime Minister Alexis 
Tsipras to establish a coalition government 
with the far right-wing populist Independ-
ent Greeks party has further reinforced 
such views within the government. Al-
though the prime minister himself has 
voiced support for the peace process, it 
is uncertain whether the Greek coalition 
government – already very unpopular 
because of the country’s economic woes – 
would be willing to bear the political risk 
of a compromise agreement in Cyprus. 
Although the decreasing interest that the 
Cyprus issue has been attracting in recent 
years may point to the fact that fears about 
domestic political costs may be exaggerated, 
it is certain that Greece’s decision to sup-
port a deal could be influenced by domestic 
political calculations. 
Turkey and Turkish Cypriots ahead 
of the Constitutional Referendum 
The overwhelming weight of the domestic 
political agenda is also a key parameter 
of Turkey’s approach to the Cyprus peace 
process. Following the abortive coup of 15 
July 2016, Turkey has been under a state of 
emergency, which has led to the suspension 
of key constitutional human rights guar-
antees and tens of thousands of arrests 
of suspected coup plotters and dissidents. 
Major concerns have arisen among Turkish 
Cypriots about the spillover effects of Turk-
ish political turmoil in northern Cyprus. 
Akıncı’s election in April 2015 had already 
been understood as a signal from the Turk-
ish Cypriot public to reduce dependence 
on Turkey and boost chances for conflict 
resolution. Nevertheless, Akıncı’s status 
in Ankara sharply improved following his 
early and outspoken support for the Turk-
ish constitutional order and President 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the evening of 
15 July 2016. Although the interpersonal 
relationship of the two leaders has clearly 
improved, the Turkish Cypriot coalition 
“government” – controlled by the nationalist 
National Unity Party (UBP) and Democratic 
Party-National Forces (DP-UG) party and led 
by Hüseyin Özgürgün – continues to drive a 
wedge between the two leaders and under-
mine the prospects of conflict resolution. 
Tensions within the Turkish Cypriot com-
munity rose sharply when Prime Minister 
Özgürgün announced his decision to follow 
Turkey’s controversial decision to scrap day-
light saving time (DST) in September 2016, 
and in early January 2017 when Barbaros 
Şansal, a Turkish fashion designer, was ar-
rested and summarily extradited to Turkey 
following a video he shared on Twitter con-
taining sharp criticism against the Turkish 
government. 
Meanwhile, a constitutional amendment 
draft was voted in January 2017 in the Turk-
ish parliament and referred to a referen-
dum that will most likely take place in 
mid April 2017. If approved, Turkey will be 
transformed into a presidential republic, 
with President Erdoğan enjoying wide und 
unchecked executive powers. It is clear that 
a positive vote in the upcoming referendum 
is President Erdoğan’s utmost priority. 
Initial opinion polls have shown that the 
referendum is likely to be close. In light of 
that, many argued that it is unlikely that 
Turkey would accept a compromise settle-
ment in Cyprus before the referendum. 
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President Erdoğan has to court the far-right 
nationalist vote in order to win the consti-
tutional referendum. As a result, the only 
chance for Turkey to agree to a Cyprus deal 
would be after the popular approval of the 
constitutional draft. 
Reduced Interest As Opportunity 
On the other hand, one needs to point out 
that – like in Greece – the Cyprus issue has 
lost the appeal it enjoyed in Turkish public 
opinion some decades ago. A series of other 
domestic and international issues have 
taken precedence, and this is likely to re-
duce the negative repercussions of a com-
promise agreement, especially if this is 
positively linked with another pressing 
issue of Turkish foreign policy. In other 
words, the way a Cyprus deal is framed 
could have a major impact on the way it 
is received by the Turkish public. Erdoğan 
himself ended the long-standing Turkish 
objection to any compromise agreement 
in Cyprus in 2004 with his support for the 
Annan Plan. It is therefore possible that he 
would support a compromise deal that is 
designed in a win-win structure in which 
Turkey’s strategic interests in the Eastern 
Mediterranean are advanced. Energy could 
be a significant instrument in that respect, 
given that conflict resolution in Cyprus 
would pave the way for the monetization 
of Eastern Mediterranean gas reserves; the 
construction of a pipeline from the offshore 
Eastern Mediterranean gas fields of Cyprus, 
Egypt, and Israel to Turkey appears as the 
most cost-effective way to achieve this. 
The Time Factor 
Although buying time may improve the 
chances of a post-referendum cooperative 
Turkish position on a Cyprus agreement, 
time is working against other crucial con-
ditions of a prospective deal. Presidential 
elections are scheduled in the Republic of 
Cyprus in February 2018. As President 
Anastasiades is again likely to be the can-
didate of his former party, DISY, and with 
AKEL appointing its own party candidate, 
the prospects of continuing their alliance 
on the Cyprus issue become dimmer the 
closer the election date comes. Both parties 
will be tempted to shift to more hard-line 
positions with the aim of courting the 
nationalist vote, which is normally con-
centrated in the smaller “center” parties 
that have opposed any compromise agree-
ment on the Cyprus issue. Moreover, in 
spring 2017, new natural gas exploratory 
drillings are scheduled in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone of the Republic of Cyprus. As 
Turkey has disputed the right of the Repub-
lic of Cyprus to commission such activities, 
it is likely to resort to unilateral acts that 
could derail the negotiation process. 
However, it would be futile to expect 
all parties of the Cyprus dispute to actively 
promote conflict resolution. Especially 
given the waning significance of the Cyprus 
issue and preoccupation with other issues 
in Greek and Turkish domestic politics, one 
does not need to exaggerate the costs of 
conflict resolution. Although Greece and 
Turkey do not have to take a lead in the 
process, their consent is crucial as a deal 
becomes crystallized. The window of oppor-
tunity that the collaboration of Anastasiades 
and Akıncı has created is closing fast, and 
the moment of truth is approaching. The 
convergences that both Cypriot leaders 
have achieved need to be maintained and 
completed with the help of the international 
community. The pledge of €3.1 billion in 
financial aid for both communities by the 
president of the European Commission, 
Jean-Claude Juncker, in the event of a solu-
tion is a strong positive message. In the 
coming weeks, Cypriots will have to make a 
stronger case about the urgency of turning 
2017 into the year for a solution to the 
Cyprus issue. 
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